When “Honor” Became a Sign of Backwardness: Rethinking Sharaf after the Tunisian Revolution
Kano Konda
18 Nov. 2026
This article is based on a presentation given by the author at the inaugural workshop of the Arab Democracy/Democratization Study Group (ADSG) in Tunis, 6-8 January 2026.
How does social change transform the words we use? And how do those words, in turn, reshape the way we see society?
In Tunisia, the Arabic word sharaf, usually translated as “honor,” has long been associated with family, social reputation, and important moral values in daily life. Yet during and after the Tunisian Revolution of 2010–11, the meaning and significance of sharaf began to change. In public discussions, it was increasingly contrasted with another Arabic concept, karāma, or “dignity,” which became one of the central ideals of the revolution.
This transformation raised an intriguing question. How did sharaf come to be defined in opposition to karāma? What did this new understanding of sharaf bring to post-revolutionary Tunisia?
From Ḥogra (humiliation) to Revolution
In 2010–11, Tunisia became the starting point of what became the Arab Spring. The protests that began in an economically marginalized inland town soon spread across the country, eventually usurping President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled Tunisia for more than two decades.
The immediate trigger was the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old street vendor in the town of Sidi Bouzid. On December 17, 2010, Bouazizi set himself on fire in front of the governorate building after local authorities confiscated his goods. His act sparked protests in Sidi Bouzid and other parts of Tunisia.
Sidi Bouzid is located in Tunisia’s interior, a region often described as “forgotten Tunisia” (Bettaïeb 2011: 8-9). Compared with the more prosperous coastal areas, the interior had been left behind by national development policies. The initial protests expressed not only anger over Bouazizi’s death but also a broader sense of injustice among people living in those regions.
One of the key words used to express this feeling was ḥogra. Ḥogra is often translated simply as “humiliation,” but it gained a particular meaning in Sidi Bouzid. As Bouazizi’s story spread, ḥogra came to refer to the feeling of being treated as worthless or inferior by an authorities' arbitrary exercise of power especially in the interior regions (Aalouach-Belkanichi 2014: 9-10; Sadiki & Saleh 2024: 45).
From January 2011 onward, a movement that began in Sidi Bouzid came to involve a wider range of people and organizations such as lawyers, human rights organizations, and feminist groups that spread nationwide. As a result, its character shifted toward movements aiming to overthrow the Ben Ali regime and achieve democratization.
At this stage, the movement’s central slogan also changed from ḥogra to “al-ḥurriyya wa-l-ʿadāla wa-l-karāma (Freedom, Justice, and Dignity).” From then, karāma became an ideology of the revolution, a concept that oriented post-revolutionary society. Ultimately, the revolution of January 14, 2011 came to be known as the “Revolution of Karāma (Dignity).”
Two Ways of Understanding Bouazizi’s Death: Intellectuals’ Interpretation
After the revolution, Tunisia entered into a hectic democratic transition period until 2014. During this period, intellectuals and public commentators engaged in intense debates over the meaning of the revolution and what kind of society Tunisia should become. One particularly important question was: Why did Bouazizi set himself on fire?
One influential interpretation explained his action through sharaf (see Table 1). According to this interpretation, Bouazizi’s act aimed to restore his own sharaf and that of his family. They interpreted his self-immolation not as an act intended to spark revolution or democratization, but as a response rooted in a local context shaped by strong tribal norms. For instance, Tunisian sociologist Mohamed Kilani and South African anthropologist Alicinda Honwana highlighted the episode in which Bouazizi was allegedly slapped by a female police officer (Takaki 2016: 99). They argued that this incident deeply humiliated him and undermined his sense of honor as a man within a traditional framework (Honwana 2013: 1).
In this context, Bouazizi’s action was understood through a local moral world shaped by tribes, family, masculinity, and social reputation.
Table 1. Interpretations of Self-Immolation Based on Sharaf
In response to this, other intellectuals challenged this interpretation by emphasizing karāma, a key slogan of the later phase of the movement (see Table 2). One of them was Nadia Marzouki, the daughter of the former president Moncef Marzouki (r.2011-14). She argued that Bouazizi did not die for the sharaf of his family or tribe, but for karāma, a more universal form of human dignity. Abdulmajid Charfi similarly framed the self-immolation as a symbol of karāma.
Furthermore, this interpretation gained international acceptance in the 2020s. Sociologist Ali Amro, a UNESCO advisor for the Arab Region, argued that the revolution marks a shift from sharaf to karāma. He defined sharaf as not only “traditional,” but also patriarchal, fragile, and prone to violence when compared to karāma.
Table 2. Counter-Interpretations of Self-Immolation through the Lens of Karāma
The important point here is not simply to judge which interpretation is correct. Rather, I am interested in what happened when one interpretation became increasingly dominant.
These debates establish a clear opposition between sharaf and karāma. The two came to be framed as contrasting concepts in every respect: tradition versus modernity, the local versus the global, tribe and family versus the individual, and culturally or geographically bounded value versus universal one. While karāma was presented as the concept befitting a post-revolutionary society striving for modernity, sharaf was cast as a notion to be overcome.
As is widely known, karāma gained the status of an ideology guiding post-revolutionary society. But then, what happened to sharaf, the concept that was relegated to its shadow?
When Sharaf Became “Traditional” and Problematic
One tangible outcome of the opposition between sharaf and karāma is in the 2017 law aimed at eliminating violence against women (Loi organique n° 2017-58 du 11 août 2017, relative à l’élimination de la violence à l’égard des femmes). This law was first proposed by the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD), Tunisia’s largest women’s association, with discussions commencing in 2014. It represents one of the major achievements of Tunisia's secular women's movement.
Sharaf was increasingly associated with violent practices such as so-called honor killings during legislative debates. The following quote shows that sharaf was brought up as a factor in such extreme cases.
“This is the case with what are commonly referred to as "honor killings," which unfortunately still exist (particularly in rural areas) and are often disguised as suicides or accidents” (Nawaat 2017)
As this quote shows, this discussion framed rural regions as more sharaf-oriented and as primary targets of this regulation. This is striking given that a murder case reported as the “first honor killing” in Tunisia actually occurred in Tunis (cf. Tunisialive 2014).
Here, sharaf functioned as a framework to deem rural societies as traditional, patriarchal, or backward. In other words, a concept that had once been discussed as part of a broader moral vocabulary became attached to an imaginary that construed inland societies as backward vis-à-vis urban areas.
Can a Revolution Against Ḥogra Produce New Ḥogra?
So far, I have examined the trajectory of sharaf through the revolutionary and post-revolutionary era. At the beginning of the revolution, protests against ḥogra spread in solidarity with marginalized populations in Tunisia’s interior regions. In this phase, the inland regions were the source of new movements.
However, in the post-revolutionary period, sharaf acquired negative connotations as karāma gained prominence. Intellectuals like Marzouki regarded sharaf not merely as a cultural concept, but as a marker of backwardness within the revolutionary narrative. The post-revolutionary secular feminist movement adopted a similar perspective. In this process, social criticism articulated through sharaf increasingly targeted rural societies.
Thus, revolution that began as a struggle against ḥogra unintentionally regenerated the very hierarchies it sought to challenge. Not through direct political repression, but by categorizing inland citizens as traditional, backward, or in need of transformation. Such a framework may, in turn, reproduce another ḥogra in rural societies.
References
Aalouach-Belkanichi, H. 2014. Les fruits de la Hogra. Editions Orizons.
Amro, A. 2021. Kinetic Karama: Bargaining for Dignity in the Pursuit of a New Arab Social Contract. In Y. Cherif (ed) The Modern Arab State: A Decade of Uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, pp. 41–67. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
Bettaïeb, V. 2011. Dégage: la Revolution Tunisienne. 17 décembre 2010-14 janvier 2011 livre témoignages. Editions du Layeur.
Charfi, A. 2012. Révolution, modernité, islam. Sud Editions.
Honwana, A. 2013. Youth and Revolution in Tunisia. Zed Books.
Kilani, M. 2011. La révolution des braves. L'Harmattan.
Marzouki, N. 2011. The Call for Dignity, or a Particular Universalism. Middle East Law and Governance 3(1-2): 148-158.
Nawaat. 2017. Le difficile combat contre des mentalités anachroniques (Aug 8, 2017). https://nawaat.org/2017/08/08/le-difficile-combat-contre-des-mentalites-anachroniques/ (Accessed on Sep 26, 2025).
Sadiki, L. & L. Saleh 2024. Revolution and Democracy in Tunisia: A Century of Protestscapes. Oxford University Press.
Tunisialive 2014. Man Burns Daughter to Death in Suspected Honor Killing (Nov 6, 2014). https://hbv-awareness.com/man-burns-daughter-to-death-in-suspected-honor-killing/ (Accessed on Nov 3, 2025).
Vermeren, P. 2011. Maghreb: les origines de la révolution démocratique (préface inédite). Pluriel.
The views expressed or implied in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of Demos Tunisia-Democratic Sustainability Forum.






